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1.

The Need for Microfoundations: Methodology
For the most part, discussion of the Marxian falling rate of profit (FRP) theory is marked by lack of attention to microeconomic detail. Precisely: how do the anarchic actions of atomistic capitals give rise to a falling rate of profit? Marx's discussion of this issue in Capital, Volume III was formulated in a microeconomic way. Briefly, the profit-maximizing urge of capitalists directs them to replace workers with machinery, which raises the organic composition of capital, which lowers (or produces a tendency to lower) the profit rate. Whether or not this argument is correct, it must be admitted it is microeconomic in this sense: it claims to deduce a macroeconomic phenomenon, itself quite beyond the ability of any individual capitalist to realize, to the Weaknesses have been pointed out in Marx's FRP theory by various authors, presented originally in a formal way in a paper of Okishio (1961) . The argument, which shall be developed in more detail later, was briefly this: if capitalists introduce technical innovation when and only when it is cost--2-reducing, then the equilibrium rate of profit will rise, in a situation when prices are determined by competition, assuming the real wage remains fixed.
Although no one believes the real wage does remain fixed, the problem has been to understand whether a FRP can be construed to be due t ' o technical innovation itself, independent of changes in the real -wage.
Responses to this claim, of Okishio and others, have been of three types.
These are, first, what Fine and Harris (1976) call fundamentalist positions on FRP. These consist, it appears to me, of postulating FRP as part of the definition of capital. Somehow, FRP is inherent in capital, hence the proposition is not a proposition, is not falsifiable. While this position may have been adopted as an invincible counter to critiques of the theory, it renders the theory completely uninteresting and powerless. Second are empirical discussions ' of whether or not the organi c composition of capital is indeeed rising. While this sort of investigation may be useful, it does not bear upon the theoretical issue of whether or not the rate of profit falls due to technical change. That is, either such investigation will be consistent with the Okishio conclusion, or it will not be: in the latter case, it would show the need for a different microeconomic argument of capitalist technical innovation; it would not, however, show Okishio's argument to be wrong. The empirical investigations, then, are certainly necessary, but they cannot provide refutation of a theory. To some extent, they appear to be carried out without sufficient consciousness of the microeconomic arguments which exist.
That is: if one believes Okishio's model, then there is no increase possible in the organic composition of capital so great as ·to reduce the rate of profit.
What, then, is the point of tracking the organic composition, unless one first -3-consciously questions the postulates of the Okishio model? Third, are arguments which argue for FRP, against the Okishio model, but on the same analytical level: that is, by postulating microeconomic behavior of capitalist technical innovation which will (may) lend to a falling rate of profit. Papers which contain elements of this position are Persky and Alberro (1978) , Shaikh (1978a Shaikh ( , 1978b and Fine and Harris (1976) . One common claim of these arguments is that if one takes fixed capital into account, as Okishio did not, then the rate of profit can be shown to fall (always, ceteris paribus, independent of wage changes).
It is the intent of this paper to examine more carefully the microeconomic foundations of the rising-rate-of-profit position. In a word, the conclusion is this: capitalist technical innovation, even in the presence of fixed capital, will produce a rising rate of profit, ceteris paribus. ( Okishio (1961) ; a more general and recent treatment is found in Roemer (1977) . The argument has been reproduced in various forms by other authors as well, such as Himmelweit (1974) and Samuelson (1974) .
We posit a p..ire circulating "capital" model where:
A is the n x n input matrix L is the n-row vector of direct labor coefficients in worker days b is the n-column vector which is the worker's daily subsistence bundle n is the equilibrium rate of profit p is the n-row vector of prices of production
The equations which specify equilibrium in the model are:
where the daily wage is taken as unity. These can be written: If and only if the innovation is viable, it will be introduced. After its introduction there will, for the time being, be a higher rate of profit earned by the innovators in Sector i; eventually, through entry and price cutting a new equilibrium will be arrived at which we call (TI*,p*):
where A* is the old matrix A with column Ai replaced by the innovation Ai*, and similarly for L*. Notice the real wage b is assumed to remain constant.
Question: Can we say anything about the relative sizes of TI* and TI? Answer: TI* will be greater than TI, if M is indecomposable . (If M is decomposable, n* may equal TI.) This, in brief, is the crucial argument: viable technical changes at constant real wages raise the equilibrium profit rate.
B. The Maximum Rate of Profit
One of the arguments which has been advanced in an attempt to mollify the impact of the above argument is that although the actual rate of profit rises, the maximal rate of profit falls. This position has been put forth by Fine and Harris (1976) and Shaikh (1978a Shaikh ( ),(1978b as significant--the claim being that if the maximal rate of profit falls over time, the system becomes more and more hemmed in, so to speak, and crisis-prone. To quote Shaikh:
The proposition that mechanization lowers the maximum rate of profit would appear to imply that sooner or later the actual rate of profit must necessarily fall. And indeed this is exactly how it has been interpreted by many Marxists. The basic logic of Marx's argument therefore, seems to emerge unscathed. (1978b, p. 20) I will argue the conclusions here do not follow from the premises.
By the maximal rate of profit is meant the rate of profit that would prevail under a given technology if the wage were reduced to zero: i.e., what return capitalists would get if they had no direct labor costs. From our F.qu.
(2.1), this is seen to be that number n, such that a price vector p exists such that:
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That is, --= is the eigenvalue of the matrix A. Let us demonstrate very 1+7T simply how the maximum rate of profit can fall with viable technical inn ovati on.
Suppose an innovation (Ai*,Li*) is capital-using and labor-saving (CU-LS) by which is meant: Ai* > Ai Li* < Li.
-, All material input coefficients increase or stay the same, and direct labor input decreases. This is the kind of technical change we think of as being common. There certainly exist viable, CU-LS technical changes. (For a complete discussion of this, see Roemer (1977) .) Clearly with such innovations, A*> A.
Since the maximal rates of profit before and after the innovation are n and n*, defined by: 1+if is the eigenvalue of A is the eigenvalue of A* 1+if* -8-it follows immediately that n* < 1f*, since it is well-known (Frobenius-Perron) that if A* _:: A then the eigenvalue of A* is greater than the eigenvalue of A.
However, by Okishio's thereom, the actual rate of profit rises, as long as the change is viable: n* > n.
Suppose, now, we have an infinite sequence of such viable CU-LS technical changes, one after the other. In each case the actual rate of profit must rise (always holding constant real wages b) and the maximal rate of profit must fall. We have: w1 < w2 < w3 < ... <wt -t -t-1 -3 -2 -1 11 11 11 11 < ... < n < n < ... < n < n < n Certainly the {ni} decrease: but they never cause the actual rate of profit to fall. In particular, any actual rate of profit ~· is a lower bound for all maximal rates of profit {ni}i= 1 ,~. In particular, the sequence of maximal rates of profit does not converge to zero, but rather to some "large" positive number: large in the sense that it is larger than any actual rate of profit the system every achieved in the hypothetical history.
Another writer who discusses the "falling maximal rate of profit" phenomenon is Schefold (1976 Clearly, what does happen in the infinite history that has been proposed is that the actual and maximal rates of profit get closer to each other. As long as the real wage remains non-zero at b, however, the two sequences cannot converge to the same limit. If, in addition, we wish to allow the real wage to vary with technical changes, then the actual rate of profit will not increase so fast, or may even decrease. That is, suppose bt is -the real wage bundle associated with the technology (A*,L*)t which is extant at time t. Let us say workers succeed in raising the real wage with each viable innovation: bt > bt-1. Then we will certainly have that the sequence {TI*(bt)} of actual rates of profit (viewed as a function of the contemporary real wage) will increase less fast than the sequence {TI*(b)} would have; and we may even have {TI*(bt)} to be a decreasing sequence in periods when the real wage rises sufficiently rapidly. In this case, of variable real wage, the maximal rates of profit (which remain the same as before) become even less "constraining" than they were before.
Another version of the falling maximal rate of profit theory is put forth by Okishio (1977) . Using the Marxian categories S, C, V, and L he observes: It should be pointed out that Okishio says there is no evidence that L/C + 0 in his paper.
Hence, the inferences that are frequently drawn concerning the actual rate of profit from the decrease in the maximal rate of profit are without foundation.
C. Rising Organic Composition of Capital Arguments
These arguments go back to Marx. Briefly they are based on this:
' -11-profit, falls. The argument is fallacious, under the assumption that the real wage remains fixed, because in that case e will always rise sufficiently to more than offset the rise in C/V, under the competitive scenario which we are assuming. (Actually, the value rate of profit may fall as a consequence of viable technical changes although the price rate of profit will never fall.
Futhermore, since the price rate of profit is always an average of the sectoral value rates of profit, it is clear the value rates of profit cannot fall too much; precision on this point is not important here.)
From a logical point of view, this is all there is to say on the question of a rising OCC. Nevertheless, many discussions of FRP are still found around the question of how fast the OCC rises. For example, Mandel's (1974) discussion of FRP is based on claims that the OCC rises fast. Moreover the rebuttals to FRP arguments frequently take the form of arguing the OCC, empirically, has not risen very fast, or has stayed constant in the twentieth century. This is the tack taken by Hodgson (1974) and Rowthorn (1976) . Now it may very well be true that the OCC has not risen fast: the point is , however, that invoking such an argument concedes too much. It implies that it is possible for the OCC to rise sufficiently fast for the rate of profit to fall. Under the assumption of a constant real wage, this is impossible; and if the real wage increases, looking at C/V is not sufficient anyway, one must also look at what happens to e.
It should probably be reiterated that I am not opposed to measuring the OCC over time--precisely because whether or not the rate of profit has fallen is an empirical question, as it rests entirely on the relation between technological change and the rate of change of the wage. We can, of course, put forth Hence, we may in fact observe rising OCC with CU-LS innovations. But that has no bearing on theories of the FRP.
3.
The rising rate of profit with fixed capital: A Special Case Shaikh (1978b) has claimed that in a model with fixed capital, the rate of profit may fall due to rational, competitive capitalist innovation. Since -13-the version of Okishio's theorem which is appropriate to the case of fixed capital does not seem to appear in the literature, it i s appropriate to present such a theorem here. In this section a special case of a fixed capital model is presented: it is assumed that there are no joint products, and that all fixed capital lasts forever. (These assumptions are related: since fixed capital does not wear out, it does not have to be considered a joint product of a process in which it is used. The only process which "produces" an item of f i xed capital is the one which manufactures it originally.) In the next section, we treat the general problem of fixed capital by examining the von Neumann model. However, it is worthwhile to treat the special case of nondepreciating fixed capital first, for several reasons: (1) it appears as a straightforward generalization of the pure circulating capital model, and the economic ideas embedded in the equations are therefore quite transparent; and (2) it is th~ polar opposite of the pure circulating capital case. That is:
if the rate of profit can be shown to rise as a consequence of technical innovation in a model when fixed capital lasts forever, a fort i ori it should rise when fixed capital wears out, this latter case being in some sense an average between the two polar cases.
Production, as before, consists of n processes producing n commodities.
We define:
A is the n x n input matrix of circulating capital c,oefficients L is the n-row vector of direct labor coefficients b is the n-column vector of worker's subsistence ~ is the n x n input matrix of fixed capital coefficients
In this case, the capital inputs into process i consist of a column Ai of -14-inputs which are consumed in the process, and a column ~i which are used but not consumed. Notice no distinction has been made in labelling "fixed capital"
goods and "circulating capital" goods and "consumption" goods. In general, we would therefore expect many components of Ai and ~i to be zero. (This formulation of the fixed capital model is due, first, to Schwartz (1961) , I believe.)
What is the equilibrium price vector p and profit rate r in this model?
It is that pair (p,r) which makes the present discounted value (PDV) of the revenue stream, from operating each process at unit level, equal to zero. That is:
Consider one component of this matrix equation (3.1), gotten by examining process i. The first term, -(p~i+pAi+Li), is the cost incurred in the first period of operation, when fixed capital to operate the process must be purchased (p~i) as well as circulating capital (pAi+Li). There is no revenue in the first period, since output only appears in the second period. In the second period, gross revenue is pi, from selling the output made last period, and gross costs are the circulating capital laid out for next period, (pAi+Li).
There is no fixed capital cost, as the fixed capital set up in the first period works forever. For all subsequent periods, net revenue is (pi-(pAi+Li)); hence equation (3.1).
Using the
we can rewrite (3.1) as:
from which the economic interpretation is clear. In equilibrium, price consists of three components: costs of materials used (pA+L), the markup on materials used r(pA+L), and the markup on fixed capital used r~. 
This is equivalent to:
Again, the economics behind the innovation criterion (3.4) are clear. Since fixed capital lasts forever, if the capitalist adopts the new technique he must continue to treat the old fixed capital as a cost. Hence he must make the . ..
normal mark-up on his total fixed capital, rp(¢ 1 +¢ 1 ). His circulating costs become, of course, (pAi*+Li*), along with their mark-up, r(pAi*+Li*). If his price exceeds the sum of these costs and mark-ups, his transitional profit rate 1 will have increased, and the technique is adopted.
1.There is another way to understand the innovation criterion (3.4). The innovation is adopted if and only if the PDV of the net revenue stream from the innovation is greater than the PDV of the remaining net revenue stream from the old technique, discounted at current (p,r); that is: 00 -(p¢*+pA*+L*) + l: (p-(pA*+L* )) > 1 (1+r)i But, by Equ. (3 .1) , the right hand side Hence this inequality reduces to (3.3).
-(pA+L) + ~ (p-(pA+~)) 1 (1+r) 1 of this inequality is equal to 9¢.
Another way to see this, perhaps more transparently, is to suppose the capitalist is borrowing money at interest rate r to pay for fixed and circulating capital. If the innovation occurs, he must pay the interest cost for setting up the new fixed capital, rp¢i*, the interest costs on the old fixed capital which he cannot sell (if the innovation is to be adopted), rp¢i, the
interest cost on borrowing for the circulating capital r(pAi +Li ), and the costs of circulating capital (pAi*+Li*). If all these costs add up to less than the price, which is condition (3.4), the capitalist i nnovates as he will make a windfall profit. It follows that r* > r, where ~ is the matr i x ~ with column i replaced by ¢i + ¢i*. (It is assumed that the matrix A*+ bL* +~is indecomposable . )
Proof: See Appendix . Still, it may be objected, there must be some force which will move capitalists to adopt a more cost-efficient technique, even if it is not advantageous for them to scrap existing machinery--that is, even if (3.4) fails to hold. And in this case the rate of profit will fall. Let us examine this.
Suppose the technique (¢*,A*,L*) is more cost-efficYent at current prices (p,r). That is:
. "* . * . * pi > rp¢1 + (1+r)(pAi +Li ) (3.5) .
• -18-Then an entrepreneur who has not previously set up the old technique will enter, and set up the new technique. Old entrepreneurs, however, will not find it profitable to switch. We will have two techniques operating simultaneously.
What happens? As long as only a few entrants operate the new technique, they earn a higher profit rate than the economy-wide rate; this profit rate differential can be viewed as a rent. When the entrants become numerous, however, prices shift and the rent falls, until eventually the new technique determines a new equilibirum price and profit rate (p**,r**). It can be shown, in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2, that r** > r. At some point in this shift from (p,r) to (p**,r**) it may become profitable for the capitalists operating the old technique (~i,Ai,Li) to innovate, according to Inequality (3.4).
Capitalists will innovate at that point at which the new internal rate of return from operating the new technique, taking into account that old fixed capital must still be written off, exceeds the internal rate of return from operating the old technique. If fixed capital eventually wears out, then it will certainly become profitable for all capitalists to adopt the new technique. The general point, however, is this: the existence of an innovation which is an improvement over existing technology, but not such an improvement as to cause capitalists to voluntarily scrap old machines and adopt it, either eventually becomes profitable for all to use, or gives rise to differential rents in the economy. (In the case where fixed capital lasts forever, it always gives rise to permanent differential rents, since the internal rate of return of the capitalist who had to scrap equipment will never be as high as that of the capitalist who started fresh with the new technique.) -19-It does not, however, cause any sort of myopic action on the part of capitalists which would lead to a fall in the general profit rate.
A final technical note should be appended to this argument. Saying that capitalists seek to maximize the internal rate of return is not tautologically the same as saying the general rate of profit increases in the economy. A theorem is required to prove this (Theorem 3.1). Maximizing the internal rate of return is the relevant notion of cutting costs in the fixed capital model. Hence, we are not saying that the economy naturally gravitates to the furthest wage-profit curve "because it's there"; rather, t hat competitive cost-cutting pushes the economy to the frontier.
It is appropriate at this juncture to mention the interesting paper of Persky and Alberro (1978) . I will take the liberty of phrasing their argument in terms of my model, and hope I am not thereby distorting it. Suppose an innovation appears, which should be introduced, according to Inequality (3.4).
The new rate of return is r*. Then, two years later, another innovat i on appears, which is again profitable to introduce, even considering that the two-year-old machines must be scrapped. (The new innovation yields an equilibrium profit rater**> r*.) But then the actual rate of return for the two year period in which the first innovation operated was considerably less than r*, for the infinite stream of positive net revenues never materialized. In this way, we see how a sequence of innovations can occur, each one of which will be adopted as it leads to a higher expected rate of return; but due to the truncated lifetimes of these innovations because of the unforeseen obsolescence, the actual rate of return falls. The most extreme case , and easiest one to see, is when the innovations occur every year, so the capitalist The Persky-Alberro proposal, then, does provide a story of a falling rate of profit. At best, it seems to work only for a short period; it cannot support a secular falling rate of profit story. It depends upon an unanticipated rate of technical change. It may be convenient to say the anarchy of capitalist production is captured in this unanticipated rate of innovation; it seems more realistic, however, to believe that capitalists are not caught unaware for long, especially given the institutional environment for successful technical development today.
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4.
The General Case or Fixed Capital: the von Neumann Hodel
In the previous section, a special model of fixed capital was considered where all fixed capital lasts forever, and there is no joint production. In this section, we treat the general von Neumann model, where fixed capital can wear out, joint production occurs, and production processes can have different periods of production. This is the most general linear model of production.
It shall be our aim to examine what happens to the rate of profit following the introduction of a cost-reducing technical change, with the real wage, as always, fixed.
To review the von Neumann model: there are n commodities, and m processes, each of which uses some inputs and labor and produces some outputs. The ith column ai and Ai of the matrix B and A give the outputs and inputs of operating process i at unit level. We call M = A + bL the augmented input coefficient matrix, and refer to the technology from now on as {B,M}. Recall that old machines are joint products themselves, which is why the joint product framework is so convenient for analyzing the general model with fixed capital.
(For a more complete discussion of fixed capital as a joint product see, for instance, Morishima (1969, chapter 6 If the matrix M is indecomposable, then the value TI* is unique, as is the price vector p*, and in fact (p*,TI*) is the equilibrium discussed above in Section 3.
Hence, the von Neumann formulation readily reduces to the characterization of equilibrium gotten by our present discounted value formulation of Section 3, in the special case there dealt with.
B. Marxian Equilibrium in the von Neumann Model
In the case of a simple Leontief model with no fixed capital, no joint production, and unit periods of production, we have the nice situation, assuming that the technology is indecomposable, that a unique price profit rate equilibrium exists. · Indeed, it is unnecessary to consider at what levels the various outputs are produced: one need only look at the price equations of the economy. This is because at the equilibrium, all processes operate at the same (and therefore maximal) profit rates, and consequently capitalists can operate all processes, and produce any desired output combination. In the von Neumann case, this is not necessarily so: since some processes will not be operated at an equilibrium described in Equ. (4.l), as they do not produce the .maximum attainable profit rate. It is necessary, then, to define an equilibri um in such a way that we are guaranteed extended reproduction is possible, while operating only those processes which produce a maximum profit rate. This might be done as follows:
Definition A. A price vector and profit rate (p,TI) are an equilibrium for the von Neumann system (B,M) if:
( 1 ) pB ~ ( 1 +TI) pM at levels x, then it is capable of supplying the inputs it needs--that is, reptoduction takes place. Condition (2) says that at activity levels x, only those processes are being operated which produce the maximum profit rate (TI) available at given price p. Capitalists will not, of course, operate any other processes. Condition (4) states that the value of output is positive, ruling out a trivial possibility. · In particular, it guarantees that x i 0 i p and that there are, by (2), some processes which support the profit rate TI.
(Notice conditions (1)- (4) are weaker than the classical van Neumann conditions for a balanced growth equilibrium. In particular, we do not require that goods which are growing faster than the minimum growth rate be priced at zero.)
It is worth pointing out that conditions (1)- (4) If the equilibrium (p,TI) is not unique, then we are not even in a situation where the falling rate of profit can be discussed. For suppose the economy is operating at an equilibrium ( p,TI) but there also exists an equilibrium -25-(p',TI'), with TI'< TI. Then, if the economy leaves the original equilibrium for some reason, there is no guarantee it will return there--it may, in fact, return to (p',TI') and the rate of profit will have fallen. But notice this fall in the profit rate is not associated with technical change or with anything in particular. It has to do with problems of multiple equilibria . Thus, if there are multiple equilibria, the problem of traverse becomes an important one in analyzing changes in the rate of profit. This is a problem which is not discussed in the Marxian literature, and is not in the tradition of falling--profit-rate discussions.
We will, therefore, limit ourselves to cases where the profit rate which will be cons idered an equilibrium profit rate, is unique. 
Then, if the technology (B,M) is irreducible (see Gale (1961, p. 314 non-zero p exists satisfying (i). This fact can be deduced from Gale (1961) .)
The purpose for engaging in the above discussion is to make clear that when one passes from the Leontief/Sraffa model to the van Neumann model one loses some convenient properties of the equilibrium price vectors: (1) in the latter model, one is not guaranteed that the price equilibrium is unique; (2) the price equilibrium cannot (necessarily) be defined independently of outputs, as it is in the Leontief system. For these reasons, the question of Given the van Neumann technology (B,M) as specified above, we define an optimal price vector as any semi-positive price vector which minimizes the profit factor for the economy:
Definition. The minimal profit factor for (B,M) is that number p* = 1 + rr* which is minimal in the set • {p 2 0 j(3p20)(pB_sppM)} Any vector p ~ 0 satisfying p*B ~ p*p*M is an optimal price vector. Morishima (1974) has called TI* the guaranteed profit rate for the economy. Discussion above has shown that for some complete definitions of equilibrium, 'IT* is the only profit rate which makes sense. Finally, we might imagine that some competitive process drives the economy to minimal-profit-rate prices. Hence, optimal price vectors in the above sense are natural Marxian equilibrium prices.
An innovation in this economy is a new process which can be characterized as a new pair of columns to be added to the B and M matrices. Call the innovation (Bm+1,Mfi1+1) where Bm+1 and Mfi1+1 are the two new column vectors.
Notice we do not replace columns of the production matrices with the innovations, as was the procedure in the simple Leontief model; rather, we append them to the old technology. In general, there are many alternative processes already in (B,M). Also, we may append many columns at once to (B,M).
We follow the same procedure for investigating changes in the rate of profit under innovation as is followed in the Leontief model in Section 2 above.
Definition. Let (p*,n*) be an optimal price vector at the minimal profit rate . . where the symbol O, in both places, is a row vector of zeros m components long.
An optimal price vector for {B,R} is in rnn+i. -33-5.
Conclusion.
For at least a generation, various writers have pointed out that there is no neces~ity for the rate of profit to fall as a consequence of technical change considered by itself (Robinson (1942) ; Sweezy (1942); Dobb (1945) shown that with such a rule, viable technical innovations will give rise to a FRP (see Roemer (1978a) ). The general point is this: if the rate of profit falls in such a changing real wage model it is a consequence of the class struggle which follows technical innovation, not because of the innovation itself. A second poss i bility for producing a FRP theory is to produce a theory -34-of rising state expenditures, which eat into before-tax profits, thus rendering a fall in the after-tax profit rate. This, indeed, is the suggestion of much recent Marxist work on the state (see Wright (1975) , O'Connor (1973) ). A third possibility, suggested by Rowthorn (1976) , is that the increase in bargaining ' power of the LDCs vis-a-vis the imperialist countries may have shifted the terms of trade against the latter, resulting in a lower rate of profit for imperial capital.
Clearly this list does not pretend to be exhaustive: the general point is that many FRP theories can exist if the pure competitive model is abandoned.
The general attack by the "fundamentalists" on these attempts is this: the "new" theories of FRP do not deduce a falling rate of profit from the development of capital itself, but from various ad hoc phenomena, such as class struggle (rising real wages), increased role of state, etc. A favorite quote, from Marx, is "The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself." (Marx (1967) where i is the sector where technical change is occuring, and i ~ 1 . Similarly, an example where w. increases is constructed by specifying the 
Part ( c):
Clearly, if the ace falls in some sectors while it necessarily increases in sector i, the aggregate ace may rise or fall depending on the composition of output (i.e . , the weights of aggregation). q.e.d. (A. 4) 
